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INAUGURAL ADDRESS,  
DELIVERED  
IN THE HALL OF THE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COLUMBIA,  
BEFORE THE  
TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA,  
DECEMBER 3, 1850,

BY THOMAS CURTIS, D. D., PRESIDENT.

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COLUMBIA, S. C.  
PRINTED BY A. S. JOHNSTON.  
1851.

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## CORRESPONDENCE.

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CAMDEN, DECEMBER 14th, 1850.

*Dear Sir,*—The South Carolina Teachers' Association desire, through their appointed committee, to express the very great gratification afforded them by the complete manner in which you have discharged the duty assigned you. Highly appreciating the superior merit of the performance, and deeply impressed with the belief that the extensive circulation of an Address, replete with sentiments so truthful and striking, will very greatly contribute to the awakening of a more anxious and active spirit in regard to education, the Association is very desirous to have a copy of it placed at its disposal. Having thus communicated to you the unanimous wish of the body which they represent, the committee desire to add their individual solicitations.

With considerations of the highest regard,

We are, respectfully,

L. M. CANDLESS, }  
J. H. CARLISLE, } *Committee.*  
A. H. BRISBANE, }

Rev'd. THOS. CURTIS, D. D.

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LIMESTONE SPRINGS, 20th Dec. 1850.

*Gentlemen,*—I place at your disposal, as you request, my Inaugural Address—in the hope that it may promote among us, in however small a degree; the neglected cause of general education, and remain

Your faithful humble servant,

THOS. CURTIS.

Messrs. CANDLESS, CARLISLE, }  
and BRISBANE. } *Committee.*



## ADDRESS.

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*Gentlemen and Fellow-Teachers :*

IN preparing, as you have desired me, something in the nature of an Inaugural, on assuming your Chair, I have found myself in the common difficulties of a small mind handling a large subject. By leaving me the whole field of our common pursuits, as Teachers, to explore, you have given one portion of my poor faculties an unusual chance of chasing others of them to death: or, at the best, you have placed me in the old logical position of a certain animal, which no man would wish to connect, *eo nomine*, with himself,—and the two bundles of hay. So that if I nibble right and left, with little profit to any one but myself—here at the Science and there at the Art of Education; sometimes at Education at large, and sometimes at the discipline of our schools; now at the minds we have to direct, and now at the difficulty of engaging them to mind us, or how *we* shall direct them—you, gentlemen, must share with me, at least, the responsibility of an ill-spent hour! I shall only demonstrate to you that of which I am well convinced,—how much abler a President you may at any time find among yourselves.

What a mighty word is Education! What a breadth and depth of meaning is in it! What projectile force and power! There is no other of greater importance to either Teachers or the taught. How many other words are contained within its range! Birth and its privileges; parentage and its influences; liberty and its peerless blessings—property; reason, science; morality, piety; with all their inestimable advantages. Education, properly understood, we say, takes them all within its scope. One might al-

most adopt, respecting it, the exclamation of Holy Writ: "Blessed are the people that know the *joyful sound!*" Nothing, certainly, is a real—that is, a realized good, to him who altogether wants a good education!

This is happily a term whose etymology sustains and pervades its modern usage. High born, for we find it used by Cicero as well as by Virgil, by Terence and by Seneca, it has not outlived, like many off-shoots of nobility, the honors of its birth. As if it contained something at once too deep and too delicate to be transfused into various languages, we have rather transferred than translated it into modern tongues. Milton, Locke and Addison use it precisely in the intellectual sense of the great Roman orators, to lead out or draw forth the mind; while Robert Boyle, a prince (a Locke, at least,) among natural philosophers, uses it in the literal sense of "the *eduction* of substantial forms," and "the *eductive* powers of matter." I advert to this etymology of the term, chiefly because it suggests a division of such observations as I shall have the honor to make to you; or this twofold question—in Education, we have—

I. To lead out—*what?* And

II. To lead out—*where*, or *whither?*

Having answered which, I may venture a few thoughts on the Discipline of Education; respecting which, if I am betrayed into a little warmth of expression, I shall be offering, you may remember, (as a great writer once said, in apologizing for the freedom of the press,) an eulogium *on a dead friend*.

1. *WHAT is it we have to lead out?* We must perceive that our success in all education; our difficulties at the beginning; our encouragements or disappointments, as we proceed; and every degree of credit or honor we can expect, as a result, must depend on the materials—and therefore on our estimate of the materials, with which we work. If I attempt to draw out lead into a wire, however far I may extend the process, I shall have only leaden wire; if gold, wire of gold. Take, for instance, Female Education. Some have contended for the mental inferiority of the sex. Woman's mind is as a different kind of metal, beside the golden mind of man! All lead, do what you will! Try it, in small masses or large; experiment upon it, hot or



cold ; in the frozen atmosphere of rebuke and discouragement, or warmed, melted by kindest sympathies and kindling hopes, brought nigh. Still, with some, and some otherwise discerning folk, too, it is nothing but lead ! Weighty, to be sure, in sufficient quantity, fusible and ductile, rather remarkably—and capable, without much art, of a dull polish : but, after all, an inferior, baser metal, and, for every high and noble use, comparatively worthless. So has thought the Grecian sage, the Mohammedan musti, and the Jewish rabbin, for ages. (To this day, in some synagogues, wives and daughters, I believe, must not worship on the same floor with husbands and sons.) So think still, perhaps, three-fourths of mankind ! All the learned classes of China, for instance, and they have pretensions to learning ! Dr. Johnson, you know, once insisted, in a memorable argument, on the *moral* inferiority of women ; until a lady, who would neither take nor give him “quarter,” brought him again and again, with growling reluctance, into the field, and finally drove him from it. “I never saw the mighty lion,” whispered Boswell, “so chafed before.” One might be more successfully positive, I presume to add, that, as to this moral inferiority, he was *wrong*, than that the asserters of the perfect equality of the sexes, as to strength of mind, *are right*. The truth is, that the whole human mind is fine gold ; but it requires an artist of more skill than has been supposed, to work it into jewelry, and to bring each specimen out to the best advantage. I, of course, should not be indisposed to add something further on the subject of Female Education ; but it would interfere with my general plan, and lead me beyond the limits of your patience. I shall dismiss it, with one remark. The *French*, who still claim, according to M. Guizot, to be at the head of civilization and its progress, have certainly gone before us, and all Europe, here. They have not, with Philadelphia, opened a Medical College for the sex ; nor have they opened the regular courses of instruction at the celebrated college of the Sorbonne to female students ; but they have instituted a regular Board of Examination there, for women, before whom appear, in the month of August, annually, from 140 to 150 young ladies and widows, who submit to a very strict investigation of

their progress in Literature and Science, and to whom, as a recommendation to their employment as Teachers, diplomas and other honors are awarded. Three Inspectors of the University, two Catholic priests, one Protestant clergyman, and a Rabbi—and three Lady Inspectresses, attend this examination. I do not know that it would disgrace either our literature or our gallantry, if hereafter a similar adjunct to our State College should be proposed.

We have a human mind, then, in the case of both sexes, to lead or draw out. I shall not exhibit the Sectarian in metaphysics, or on any other point, I trust, to-day. The obtrusion, upon his equals, of what any man may feel to be his *peculiar* views on such a subject (and on such an occasion) as this, I hold to be somewhat, in a logical sense at least, impertinent. He is often supposed to speak for, or in the name of, his constituents; and because they may tolerate the exhibition of his crotchets, he is apt to flatter himself that they endorse them. My observations, then, will be general, and of no exclusive school. I shall not at all attempt, certainly, to lead you into a modern school, which, in the language of its chief advocate, M. Cousin, assumes to furnish (we wonder how so able a man could write such a sentence) "*the absolute explanation of everything.*"

But we have a human mind to lead out—not that of an angel, unfallen or fallen. That of an intelligent being of high order, but not the highest; of great imperfections and faults, but not those of the worst possible character. I speak at once to a point, in the experience of us all: for that which is by Revelation more fully ascertained to us, I hold to be discernible, in the entire outline, by intelligent observation. Here is a being of noble powers and capacities, but they are slowly developed; and their *limits* I find a first duty both to remember and to teach. If in anything the science of mind has advanced of late years, it has been in the knowledge and practical acknowledgment of these limits. As the existence of man here, in connection with what we find *he is*, argues that he will exist hereafter, so the very excellence of his mental nature argues the probability of higher excellence, even in this universe of creatures. It is not an angel we have to teach,



nor angelic powers to lead or draw out, in any stage of our work as Teachers—powers of high distinction, but not thus high.

On the other hand, we find in him mental and moral discrepancies, imperfections, faults—crime. There is the perpetual conflict between reason and sense, which even heathen moralists lament. Plato's satire upon some perfectionists of his day, will apply to the optimists with regard to young people whom we occasionally meet with in our own. "If," says he, in his *Meno*, "children were (φύσει) by nature good, it were only necessary to shut them up to keep them good;" in other words, why educate them at all? We have a faulty being to teach and control: just inasmuch as he is committed to us to educate—to *govern*. We may imagine him better in any or every respect than he is, in which case we shall not sufficiently control what is bad; we may imagine him worse, until we only contribute to making him so. It is neither the powers of a pure nor those of a fallen angel, we have to educe; those of a being prone only to good, nor those of one of unmixed and unmitigated evil character; or of whom we ought, at any time, morally to despair.

Then we have, by the very name of our undertaking, to lead, draw out, or guide; not to create, extort or drive forth, either as a whole, or in part, these latent powers of his; *not* to

Tear ope the blushing bud to make a flower.

And here I take a stand between two extremes. The one an ancient, the other a modern mistake, I submit. Looking back through rigid Rome to semi-barbarous Sparta, we perceive the iron hand of mere authority attempting to accomplish everything in Education, (so called) *by* anything but educative methods. All is seizure, rough and reckless tearing forth such powers of the young mind, as public or domestic leaders chose to appropriate to building up the supposed interests of the State, or the fortunes of a family—a kind of Cæsarean operation, not resorted to as the undesired exception, but as the rule, in every case of the mental birth of a citizen. In nothing was Nature consulted, much less waited upon; there was no hope, because no faith, in her developements. The young citizen must be compressed, or tortured, to a given model; shortened to

the size of the procrustean bed, or stretched and elongated, until the energies of his mind were broken or dislocated. Relics of this dictation *to* Nature, substituted for the congenial guidance of nature, have been to a late date found in the scholastic polity of Europe; may be found, perhaps, in that of Prussia at this day. Instruction and its means are mistaken for Education and its issues. But how many men can instruct that cannot educate! Instruction is not education. "You may make a mere *drench*" of the former, as I have read; "and find as much difficulty in opening a mule's mouth for it, as that of the best horse in your stable." This is one extreme. Another is, for the pupil to be master of the teacher and all his plans; or for youth to be so consulted on the entire scheme and details of their education, as that, not only what is necessary in most cases, and indispensable in some, is alike disregarded, but that only which ignorance appreciates as the suitable knowledge, and that which idleness or obstinacy may dictate as alone desirable, is chosen; and the education (miscalled) is conducted on the *minimum* of instruction; or as little as possible to pass the pupil off as educated. Here is the other extreme. Nothing as it might and should be is educed in the one case, because the mind's own vigor and capacity are not consulted—there is no faith in mind, properly so called. Nothing in the other, because the powers that were born into this world to be led, restrain or refuse all guidance.

The whole intellect, weak or powerful, must be subjected to the happier medium method. As in the structure of the corporeal powers there is a happy similarity, a physical identity, to a large extent, in the bodies of mankind, so is there a general similarity between the mental powers and faculties; and what the pathology of *dissection* is to the young anatomist, a sound mental and moral philosophy must be to the young Teacher—*based, of course, on this similarity*. Every where do we find the same great bones and sinews of the mind; the same processes of sustenance and circulation in thought and moral feelings: and we must study the mental frame-work as it is, and as it works—not forgetting two things. That we are not commissioned to improve, but to develope *it*; and that we have not the anatomist's advantage of studying a

whole quiet, if dead, subject. We cannot examine it in every part or as a whole, *ad libitum*, and while at rest. The mental economy is only presented to us in an active, working state; one faculty (so called) acting upon and blending into another and another's functions, perpetually. The mind was never subject to dissection. Its indivisibility is its glory, its energy, its best natural hope and foreshadowing of immortality. You may distinguish, then, in their operations, but you cannot divide, its operative powers. The dissection-knife *here* (where you have none but living subjects to act upon) has inflicted many a mortal wound. We are not warranted, as I find, to assume that the mental powers are, or are *not*, in fact, separate functions, in the usual acceptation of that term, and therefore we act and speak best, as Dr. Abercrombie has well remarked—simply, of their “operations on a given series of facts.” We are “the ministers,” as Lord Bacon long ago said, “of the mental nature,” we find—“not the masters; the interpreters, not the legislators,” *here*.

Yet one of these faculties or functions may be more active, and demand more attention in one pupil than another. In one young person, how strong is the memory; in another, how weak! How rapid the conceptive, how dull the abstractive powers, of another! One is all imagination; another,

“A Daniel come to—*judgment!*”

I contend for an intelligent and penetrating analysis of these peculiarities in the powers of our pupils—so far as the extent of our superintendence of them will permit. Nay, further, that the mind of each pupil is, in itself, a distinct study, on which an angel might be well engaged for all the time ordinarily allotted to its education; and yet, that there is an indestructible, impenetrable unity in the nature of all mind—so that, after the ablest analysis, we shall find its functions interpenetrating and beautifully blending with each other. *E pluribus unum!* Now the science of Education, gentlemen, is so thoroughly to know, as to lead out, to the best advantage, this wondrous unity, a human mind, *as an unit*—and yet with a masterly (and not an ordinary Master's) respect to each of its distinct powers. And thus much for my first enquiry: *What* we have, in Education, to lead out.

2. My second enquiry, To lead out [the mind] *where*, or *whither*? may be said, I think, to embrace the whole Art of Education.

We shall be all agreed, and every one of our patrons in public or private institutions will agree with us, that USEFULNESS, personal and social, is the obvious goal to which, in every form of Education, we must attempt to lead the mind. That this is our watch-word, and pole-star; the culminating point of effort, in which *all* its lines are to blend, if not to terminate. But what is the meaning here of usefulness? As diversified, clearly, as the features of the human countenance, the idiosyncrasies of the mind, or the prospects and probable fortunes of life. It is greatly varied, too, by the different stages or periods of life. That is useful at its commencement, which is soon no longer so; that is valuable, as a pursuit or attainment, in middle life, of which we lose all the relish, and can be made in no way conscious of the utility, as we approach "the bourne from which no traveller returns."

To come to something practical. We may adopt, (as to usefulness) safely and primarily, with our pupils, the words of no common observer, respecting wisdom. "If thou be useful, thou shalt be useful to thyself." The first object of a judicious leading out of the mind, is to strengthen and enlarge its own power; and men may well be divided about what are the studies that most conduce to this: but all elementary branches in language, in mathematics, in history, and in philosophy, are surely meant to bear upon this point. Some are carried far beyond what is elementary, in very celebrated seats of learning, for this object chiefly, if not solely—as the higher Mathematics in the education of the English clergy. A Regius professor of Divinity, now a bishop of the Episcopal Church, thus toiled his upward way (as he told me) into the Lucasian professorship of Mathematics in the University of Cambridge (a chair once filled by Sir Isaac Newton,)—while, *perhaps*, he could not read a chapter in the Hebrew Bible. Other high officers in that University (which, without being considerable mathematicians, they could not be,) have avowed an equal deficiency in the knowledge of the original Scriptures. Such cases supply this reflection. That while the direct usefulness of the Mathematics, in acumi-

nating and strengthening a man's powers of mind, may be admitted, the path of a common sense economy of those powers would be, to select such means and measures of doing this, as might better bear on *future* usefulness. In the first of these cases, the man or the logician, at the best, was improved and strengthened, while the theologian was weakened, or left unfurnished: the sword of the metaphysician sharpened, (for the mathematics may well be accorded that title,) while that of God's word was laid aside, with the chance, when it was wanted, of being found pointless or rusty. To lead out the young clergyman's mind into the mere Mathematician's chair, as a terminus, (especially when you remember what months and years of his prime may be consumed to reach it,) would seem but the counter-part of leading the mere carpenter into the pulpit. The mathematical exclusiveness of such a training of the Clergy, seems, moreover, to make Education what it never should be thought—an end of life, and not a means. "To live is not to learn," as a French writer has well said, "but to apply."

Our views of usefulness, therefore, as an object of Education, must not be one-sided. They should bear, assuredly, upon what is probable as to the whole of future life. And these examples, from high quarters, bear upon what is applicable to Common Schools, and every grade of education between them and the College. *That* is the true art of Education which secures in it the greatest measure of *adaptedness* to the claims of after life. Your well-ordered and experienced minds, gentlemen, will suggest a hundred illustrations of this sentiment.

'To confine myself, as in this Address I must, to general observations, the basis of an useful Education, bearing on the learned professions, seems happily *common* to them all. All must have a foundation in those principles of Grammar which are universal; and these will be found as conveniently, at least, I venture to opine, (with perhaps the obsolete prejudices of a grammar-school boy,) in the Latin Grammar, as anywhere. Hence, may you teach, undoubtedly, the entire substance of the English Grammar, while you are teaching the Latin; although the converse is not true: and hence the policy, if sound learning is worth sowing broadcast over a land, of the phrase "Gram-



mar Schools," in England, being legally held to mean a school where the Latin Grammar *must* be taught. All the professions need the rudiments, at least, of mathematical learning, not only to strengthen the mind, but while *meum* and *tuum* shall be words whose meaning no man may forget—a liberal foundation in history; and more of natural philosophy than is usually obtained in schools. At the well-conducted Academy, then, I hold, that which has any pretensions to prepare youth for College, these common and indispensable foundations of professional learning may be laid. And there would I lay them solidly—those foundation principles of *all* liberal education, that should give a young man, as well as his parents, *the means* of rationally choosing a profession. *The ignoramus has no such means.* A profession may be chosen for us and by us, far too early. Too lightly chosen it must have been, *wherever* it is lightly abandoned—*where* lawyers would sometimes induce one to suppose the world was indeed "without law," so anxious are they to be found *not* expounding the past, but clothed with the powers of *new* legislation; *where* neither mercantile nor idle and dandy physicians are rare; and *where merely* professional and wholly incompetent clergymen are found, perhaps, in equal numbers. All these cases argue, I contend, the precocious choice of a profession, somewhere: the boy, perhaps, consulted, until he fetters and makes boyish the conduct of the man for half his life; or ignorance choosing all it will be taught, (a choice not confined to boys,) until it learns nothing. I wholly approve and applaud the liberty of choice in young men, at the right period; I only contend that it should be a later period than it often is. I would not heed a child crying for the moon; nor trust the chariot of Phœbus to any Phæton.\*

Therefore is it, that I recommend to your *investigation*, gentlemen, a considerable improvement, as I regard it, lately proposed to the Corporation of Brown University—an improvement in that *next stage* of a superior education, at which a young man may be expected to choose his profession, with some competent knowledge of what he decides upon; and *so* to determine as to persevere. It offers a happy medium between the extremely conservative and

\* A note to this will be found at the end of this Address.



the ultra progressive economy of a College. At the Prussian gymnasium not above a third of the time is now occupied with the studies that in former years occupied the whole.

Dr. Wayland has examined personally and with care the English system, too much, clearly, (and especially for this country) in the first of these extremes, and that of the early colleges of the United States: those which matured not only profound theologians, but those jurists and statesmen who did intellectual battle with the ablest men of the mother country, at the Revolution, and obtained the memorable eulogy of Chatham, with regard to their first State papers. "We certainly," as the president of Brown remarks, "have no reason to be ashamed of the early colleges of this country." It is with no love of innovation, then, nor without great respect for earlier methods, that he proposes an important change. For the very progress of Science may become a clog upon the wheels of Education! It has so operated, he shows, as to introduce "a high-pressure system" in the northern colleges, by which, for the last 20 years, more has been attempted to be done in a given time than can satisfactorily be accomplished. In the most celebrated College of New England, the under graduate course embraces Latin, Greek and Mathematics, (comprising Geometry, Algebra, Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, and Analytical Geometry,) Ancient and Modern History, Chemistry, Rhetoric, French, Psychology, Ethics, Physics, Logic, Botany, Political Economy, the Evidences of Religion, Constitution of the United States, Mineralogy, Geology, and German or Spanish, or an equivalent; together with Essays to be written in several of these departments, and instruction in Elocution.

He represents the effect of this system, which he evidently depicts from the life. The student, when a working man; working wearily; studying, not from the love of his study, but to accomplish his task. He turns, mechanically, from one text-book to another; his own powers all monopolized by the mere acquisition of what is before him, and having no free play. He "crams" for recitation or examination, and when this last is over his work is done, and how willingly does he forget half or more of what he has studied! It gave him no pleasure, has yielded him no fruit; and he gladly dismisses it from his thoughts.

Dr. W. suggests, 1. The abandonment of any fixed term of years for the entire collegiate course. Let the time allotted to each particular study be determined by its own nature; and every student be allowed, within given limits, to take a greater or less number, as he may choose. But, 2. Every course of instruction, once commenced, should be continued until completed. 3. Every student, seeking a degree, should sustain, as now, an honorable examination in prescribed studies; no student, however, being under any obligation to proceed to a degree, unless he choose. 4. Every student should be entitled to a certificate of such progress as he may have made in any course.

And now he proposes a pretty liberal bill of fare; respecting which, I would only say (especially as to the latter part,) there is still the objection of some northern tables—*fast feeding*. Latin, Greek, Modern Languages, and the pure Mathematics, occupy, respectively, two years each; Mechanics, Optics and Astronomy, a course of one year and a half; Chemistry, Physiology and Geology, one year and a half; the English Language and Rhetoric, one year; Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, one year; Political Economy and History, one *term* each. Courses of instruction in the science of Teaching, in Agriculture, on the application of Science, generally, and particularly of Chemistry, to the arts; and in the science of Law, are also proposed to be given, without a limit of time for them being fixed.

The primary object has been, we are told, to provide in College not merely for the learned, but for "*the productive*" professions; not for a restricted class, or a few classes, but for all. Some courses will be abridged or abolished, others amplified, or substitutes introduced, in the working of the plan. It is further proposed to make the professors in each department depend largely, perhaps chiefly, for remuneration, on the fees of their class.

Too little time, certainly, is here given to some important studies. History, (all history, apparently,) but one term; Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, one term! and the whole English Language and Elocution (the classic tongue of Christianity and Civil Liberty,) one year only! While of the evidences of our Religion, not the less national, I hope, because not established by human laws—no distinct notice whatever is taken. My friend must have forgotten

the touch of Wordsworth's pencil, respecting an University, as the place

Where Science, leagued with *holier* Truth,  
Guards the sacred heart of youth.

But sufficiently valuable, I presume to think, are *many* of his alterations, to demand the cordial examination of all superior Teachers.

And here, as we are on the point of usefulness, while I would not consume your time with common-places—*if* you would lead out a people, and not a populace, to the ballot-box; and *if*, in any emergency hereafter, you must have recourse to self-defence in arms—remember the complaint of the greatest victim of disappointed ambition—"I never could make France a people;" and oh! lead the whole of your white population to well-taught *Common Schools*. Let them know *for what* the founders of this great Commonwealth strove, and how they obtained it; not by the brute force, merely, of the hireling soldier, but by the untiring efforts, in all ranks, of the soldier-citizen. I blushed for South Carolina, (and more for their superiors in station than for them,) when I heard of one-half of the returning Palmetto regiment not being able to write their names! Take it as a fact of authentic history, I would say to her Legislators, that mere animal bravery in a populace, is, in the long run, *recuperative*—it falls back upon the State, whose main reliance it is; and takes back to its own use the energies it may first yield to you. How fell the ancient Republics; how, in modern times, Napoleon? And why stands France at this moment on the verge of an unknown and probably a bloody future struggle? He who knew her best, of all modern men, has told you, in the words I have already quoted. *France is not yet a people*. Observe, it was neither in the ancient nor modern case—a total ignorance in all ranks of the principles of government that can be alleged. The ancients could quote home authorities on the science of Politics, (a Plato and an Aristotle,) of whom we are yet proud to learn. It was the *kind of foundation* on which the fabric of government rested. This was unstable as water; because never "based deep enough in the mental and moral improvement of the *common mind*."

Society at the broad base of the pyramid *must be* no

longer base in other senses. You must pour in a flood of mental and moral light *there*; it must not play merely upon the edges of society, so to speak; on a *few* prominent materials, only, and not on *the many*—or, as it has been well said, “it will be like the northern lights when the sun is set—sufficient to attract to you the curiosity of the world,” but never offering any well-founded hopes of the permanence of civil institutions. Never, perhaps, were these lessons of history more important to be heeded by any State on earth, than by South Carolina at this juncture. There is a conservative power in the general diffusion of knowledge which has rarely been believed—never sufficiently acted upon.

I arrive now at a topic of yet higher interest, toward which all real education of a being like man, must invariably lead—his moral and religious developement. You must conduct him through a mental to a moral self-knowledge, as a first lesson of morals, and one of the best and last of a sound philosophy: the apex of the pyramid, pointing to the

First Good, first Perfect, and first Fair!

The twofold union of all sound reasoning or Mental Philosophy with Morals, and of all sound Morals with Religion, is *the* capital Truth of Education; and we shall see, I trust, before we close, that while we meet with controverted points all the way, (for what great truth or excellent principle has not been matter of controversy?) this does not involve, necessarily, any sectarian views of our Holy Religion, particularly as a part of Education.

And here I find the views of Bishop Butler, so distinguished for their profoundness, and those of Abercrombie, as remarkable for their simplicity, uniting, in a leading point, the *supremacy* of Conscience. The Education that does not lead out the mind of its pupils straight to her throne, is worse than none; while a thorough acquaintance with *that faculty*, its mental and moral connections and claims, its obscuration and practical imperfections; together with the means of its enlightenment and full efficiency—offer a salient point, whence the judicious teacher may lead to and secure the best end of Education. As Sir James Mackintosh says, truly, this doctrine of “Conscience, the superior of the whole man,” is far older than



either of the writers I have named—and was, perhaps, what the ancients generally, “but *confusedly* aimed” at, “when they laid it down that Virtue consisted in following Nature:” especially if Seneca may expound his predecessors—“Whatever nature does, God does.” But oh! that Abercrombie had been the Secretary of the cloudy Bishop! Which of us that has attempted to break through his luminous clouds, as guides of the young, will not subscribe to another opinion of Macintosh’s—“No thinker so great was ever so bad a writer.” Gentlemen, if any one of you could give his days and nights to thinning away these clouds into good modern English, it would be a task in which all degrees of success would be too glorious to suffer much of partial failure to be any disgrace. I commend it your best minds!

This *work upon* that book, (his “Analogy,”) by the bye—working with the book and toward the book, is our more direct and present subject. And it may well introduce what I humbly conceive we can do in Education, as to Morals and Religion; and what we cannot do. We can clear the forest of great hindrances; enclose the field; plough it well; and prepare it for valuable *first* crops: some of which, in decided moral and religious personal character, we may have the happiness to see. But we may not wisely confound the School and the Church. We cannot, I think, undertake much of the spade-husbandry of religion; or do much in the way of gardening in the former: this pertains to the Church. In the entirely public institutions of the land, the high and otherwise useful walls of denominational distinctions *may not* be erected. Rarely, as I submit, in the best private Academies, that solicit public patronage. Therefore am I not an advocate for dividing the country between what have been called Denominational Schools. You cannot do this and secure the best of assistant talent; *unless* each denomination is to act on the supposition of itself, alone, containing it: and I see many objections to sharpening up young minds with the arguments for party creeds—*when* so much common ground is presented by all orthodox denominations, on which they may be trained for God and heaven. (Of course there are peculiar circumstances that may dictate a particular course; and freely can I accord to others to determine what they

are.) That common ground I take to be *what* Bishop Butler every where so well presents or implies; and which he may very well be held to endorse for us. I would lead *up* to him; and in the School and Recitation room be very well contented there to finish. It embraces an ample extent of *preparatory* Moral Studies, in which we shall all use the books, of course, with which we are most familiar—which are best accredited to us by what we find they *can do*: and in the able and conscientious Teacher's hand, how often will the most homely and overlooked volume, like David's stones of the brook, be of far more practical service than the royal armor untried, or the weapons of a Goliath!

One thing I may be permitted to add here, as the result of conscientious observation through a long life—the manner in which I am struck by the *uniformity* of the best opinions in morals. Dr. Paley and Mr. Locke, very great names I cannot forget, have argued for an opposite conclusion; and the former to such an extent, as almost to exclude a real conscience, or moral sense, from the functions of the mind. But this is when that popular writer is arguing for a philosophical system. On a more important occasion, when he is discharging the high office of the Christian Preacher, what does he himself say? “Our own conscience is to be our guide in all things.” “It is through the whisperings of conscience that the Spirit (of God) speaks.” But I place by the side of these names, in the argument *ad verecundiam*, one at least of equal or superior general learning, Grotius, sustained by the approval of a more acute metaphysician than Paley—Sir James Mackintosh. “He,” (Grotius) says this last writer, “quotes historians, poets and orators in abundance, as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony (mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance in almost every other subject) is a conclusive proof of the *unanimity of the whole human race* on the great rules of duty and the *fundamental* principles of morals.” I know no greater argument for the existence, and, in a qualified sense, for the Inspiration of Conscience. St. Paul has an appeal to it in the “*Whatsoever things are true, honest, just,*” &c., of one of his Epistles. Its *philosophical* connection with the highest views of religion is well put by various writers: by none so briefly, yet satis-



factorily, as by Butler, in a volume not so well known as his "Analogy." "Goodness is the immediate object of [every intelligent being's] love." What *is* goodness we learn through the medium of our own moral nature, assisted by Revelation and every kind of light within our reach. "In a Being who is to be perfectly loved, goodness must be the simple, actuating principle."

"The highest and only *adequate* object of our affection is *perfect* goodness. This, therefore, we are to love with all our heart, with all our soul and with all our strength." "We should refer ourselves implicitly *to* Him and cast ourselves entirely upon Him. The whole attention of life should be, to obey His commands." Every valuable Moral principle, as it has been well remarked, is thus presupposed, before a solid step can be made in Religion. And thus I close such response as I have to offer to my second Enquiry. 'Whither' a good Education is '*to lead*' the mind? *To usefulness*, we say; in the sense of craning upon one's own powers to their greatest strength and best advantage, and in the sense of *Adaptedness* to the future prospects of life; to a sound basis of *Learning* for any of the professions, and to proper materials for *the choice* of a profession; to a broad and practical survey of the *Natural Sciences*, to *Morality*, to *Piety*, and to *God*!

I have ventured to promise something on the Discipline of Education. This, of course, must be modified by the extent to which young people are placed under our charge. That of the School or Recitation room, is one thing; that of the young person domesticated with us, another; that of a large public or collegiate establishment, a third and very different thing. We speak of making all discipline parental; but this can only be possible, so far as we are clothed with parental powers, qualified by parental feelings; and where these last are genuine, can they be transferred? *This* is an enquiry to be borne in mind. On the other hand, and for the honor of our profession, I claim another fact or two to be remembered. *Real* Educators, of youth fairly entrusted to them—will and do imbibe, continually, something more than many a parent's interest, in diligent and well principled pupils; while such pupils will return occasionally, something only short, but still short, of

a natural filial attachment. The advantage is, then, where it should be, greatly on that kind of pupils' side.

I take the axiom of my old friend, Mr. Coleridge, to be true as any one in Euclid. "The perfection of discipline in a school is the *maximum* of watchfulness, with the *minimum* of punishment." There is no error in it; but a great defect. It assumes that discipline is mainly conversant with faults or crime. So do most definitions of this important matter. But why? Discipline might thus be shown to be no part of Education. For would you educe, *per se*—lead out, or train up, faults? Discipline should be the practical part (as distinguished from the literal teaching) of making a *discipulus*, or disciple. Not the mere combat of evil with evil. This is a miserable and a mischeivous view of it; but in words of great 'pith and moment' even here it is—"Overcoming evil with good." It is the art of bringing out and fostering all good impulses and motives, so as to overcome all bad ones. Cowper has put this matter more correctly than the later poet, when he says, of the Discipline of "ancient" (and in many respects, stricter) "days:"

The occupation dearest to his heart,  
Was to encourage goodness.

And that he could thus so far prevail, that

Learning grew  
Beneath his care, a thriving, vigorous plant,  
The mind was well informed, the passions held  
Subordinate, and diligence was choice.

The penal part of his task was the exception, and its methods gentle.

If e'er it chanced, as sometimes chance it must,  
That one among the many, overleaped  
The limits of control, his gentle eye,  
Grew stern, and darted a severe rebuke;  
His frown was full of terror, and his voice  
Shook the delinquent with such fits of awe,  
As left him not, till penitence had won  
Lost favor back again.

Mr. Abbott, in his *Teacher*, mentions a practical case of such discipline; in his manner of rebuking a boy for swearing. The passage is familiar, I do not doubt, to many of my auditors; and concludes, "The question is, do you wish to abandon this habit or not? If you do, all is well.

I shall immediately forget all the past, and will do all I can to help you to resist and overcome temptation. But all *I can do is only to help you.*" A preceding observation is worth something. "The man who is accustomed to scold, storm and punish with unsparing severity every transgression, under the influence of irritation and anger, must not expect that *he* can win over his pupils to confidence in *him*, and to the principles of duty, by a word."

And yet the discipline of a School or College must be as various, we are free to admit, as its various dispositions—in proportion to its size, as various as that of any army under heaven. The general impression of observant minds, is, that is *has been* too rigid, and that *it is* too lax; or that speaking locally, there are many remains of its undue severity in Europe—some in England, more in Prussia, and an almost total forgetfulness of its just claims (except at West Point) in this Union:—in other words, that the former is the European extreme, the latter, the American. One practical remark may be here permitted and will afford matter of useful reflection. The English schools where the old rigor is retained, are those of the higher classes; those where the sons of Noblemen and of rich Commoners are trained for College, and *these Schools* (Winchester, Eton, Westminster and Harrow, to-wit:) are those of the highest classical attainments. On the walls of the School room in the first of them, are the memorable lines still seen,

Aut disce, aut discede !  
Manet sors tertia—*cædi* !

May I say, given in spirit, if loosely enough, by Lord Byron ?

Oh ! ye who teach the ingenuous youth of nations,  
Holland, France, England, Germany and Spain !  
I pray you flog them upon all occasions;  
It mends their manners, never mind their pain.\*

If we go back to the times of Alfred, one of the Founders of Winchester, we shall find a tragical legend of ancient discipline. One of *his* tutors, Johannes Scotus, call-

\*Had his Lordship not been born a Lord, (or at least had he not become one in his teens) and been himself subject, under the eye of a good parent, to thrice the Discipline he ever knew, it has often seemed to us, that he might have made a far happier and better man.

ed also Evigena, from the place of his birth, in Ireland, was afterwards a Schoolmaster of so much rigor that his pupils rose against him in rebellion, and wounded him mortally with their knives.

I thought the other day, that the Winchester motto was about to become appropriate in Boston—where “thirty-one Schoolmasters” ask the Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, “Upon what shall School Discipline be based?” and reply, “*We* answer, unhesitatingly, upon *authority* as a starting point. As the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” (our Northern friends, forgetting what a volume of wisdom there is in that word fear,) “so is the fear of *the law*, the beginning of political wisdom. We object, then,” they continue, “to the idea that the relation of a pupil to his Teacher is one of affection first, and then duty. We would reverse the terms. True obedience does not voluntarily comply with a request, but implicitly yields to command. Obedience recognises the existence of abstract authority.” There is much more in this strain. “Kindness cannot supply the place of *authority*, nor gratitude that of submission.” “He, the ruler, governs to teach obedience. The governed, on his part, is *not* from sympathy, and affection, and harmony of opinion, to obey the individual, but the authority residing in him, rather.” All this we think as fallacious in principle, as it is despotic in tone. The fear of the Lord should be filial, as will be that of every efficient Teacher: and one thing is it to fear *God*, a personal and paternal Being, and another to fear any *law*. If the Teacher’s task is parental, affection assuredly comes first as a motive; or how does the true mother “teach the” youngest “ideas how to shoot?” Nor do we govern to teach obedience, but *vice versa*; and *both* are but means in Education to create a sympathy with us on the part of our pupils, in the estimate of its objects, and to produce that very harmony of feelings and opinion in regard to them which these sages seem to despise. Dr. Busby’s ghost, could it be consulted, would almost blush at the arbitrary principles here avowed.

Mr. Horace Mann, we think, (much as we differ with him on other topics,) has exhibited the exact truth here. “I would by no means be understood to express the opinion, that in the present state of society, punishment, and



even corporal punishment, can be dispensed with, by all teachers; in all schools, and with regard to all scholars.— Order is emphatically the first law of a schoolroom. Order must be preserved, because it is a prerequisite to every thing else that is desirable. If a school cannot be continued with order, it should not be continued without it, but discontinued. *After* all motives of duty, of affection, of the love of knowledge, and of good repute have been faithfully tried, and tried in vain, I see not why this “strange work” may not be admitted into the human as into the divine government. Nor will it do to prohibit the exercise of this power altogether because it is sometimes abused. The remedy for abuse is not prohibition, but discretion. This, however, is certain, that when a teacher preserves order and secures progress, the *minimum* of punishment shows the maximum of qualification.”\*

We may well suppose that great improvements have been made in the Boston Grammar Schools, within the last eight years. I would therefore make use of a Report of the Committee authorised by the Legislature to look into their state, in 1842, rather as containing some useful hints to *ourselves*, than as any description of their present state. At that time the committee had “forced upon them the impression that a too great reliance was placed upon going through the *mere routine of studies and books*, and giving to the scholars only that which is laid down and absolutely required.” They speak of “those pupils who enjoy the advantage of having an instructor whose mind is well furnished with general knowledge, and who embraces every occasion to impart this knowledge,” as very different in their acquirements from “those whose instructor contents himself with *the page* before him;” and of the former kind of teacher being rather to be “hoped for” at that time, “than generally seen” in those Schools—adding this remarkable observation, “*If* they were obliged to give up *all hope* of *this* description, they would be almost led to the recommendation of some cast iron moulds, which shall turn out a given number of words in a day, that so the machinery of the schools might be perfect throughout.” They then particularize, that in the study of Grammar, of Geography,

\*Fifth Report of Massachusetts Board of Education.

and of History, there seemed to be little "understanding of the *terms* used ;" that "the *whole subject* was a land of darkness ;"—the knowledge "for the most part, verbal ;" so that with regard to a connected series of facts—except you struck upon the one first in order, as you might strike upon—"a row of bricks, one of which set in motion," you could not get the rest to follow. Yet the salary of these Masters was at that time, \$1,500—but this is not an occasion for pursuing these details.

Discipline should be mild, but firm ; various as the dispositions submitted to it, but uniform, steady ; transparent, as to its motives, to the intelligent child, upwards ; but far-seeing and far-reaching in its final designs. It should be a counterpart of high, judicial excellence : grave, patient, tranquil, exact, ready ; profound in knowledge and of *perfect impartiality*.\* Mr. Mann is in a sentimental extreme when he says, "punishment is never inflicted in the right spirit when it is not more painful to him who imposes than to him who receives it." But we believe that where *temper* in the Teacher presides over its measure, it will excite a reciprocal evil of temper, sufficient to destroy its usefulness ; that its influences as they "affect the whole moral nature, must be calculated in reference to the whole ;" and hence that it is a subject that can never be satisfactorily "discussed alone."

Our growth—the characteristic *product* of the country—has been said to be *man*. May it be that of good men ! We emulate the great in history, the skilful in art, the brave in arms ! May we more than emulate the people an Alfred or a Henry IV. of France would have formed. The former urged upon his bishops that "useful books might be translated so that *all* could understand them," and directed his *first* attention, we are told, to the general diffusion of knowledge. Alas ! that we must go back so far for our best model rulers—in this respect ; and that the people of modern times (looking particularly at some European developments) seem to stoop so much in character, as they ascend the hill of power ! Great truth, too, is there certainly in the observation, that while men were formerly

\*See a character of the late Chief Justice Tindel, Blackwood's Mag. Oct., 1850.



worse than their principles—the principles are now often worse than the men. And *this* is what Education, under God's blessing, has to cure.

"Nor have we far to seek," in the words of a departed sage, "for whatever it is most important that we should find. The wisdom from above has not ceased for us.—*The principles of the oracles of God* are still uttered before the altar;—oracles which we may consult without cost;—before an altar where no sacrifice is required, but of the vices that unman us; no victims, but the unclean and animal passions which we have suffered to house within us; the spiritual sloth, or goat, or fox, or hog, which lays waste the vineyard which God has fenced and planted for himself."

\*NOTE TO PAGE 14.—I would submit, as a model of a modern classical Education, the example of the truly great and good, if somewhat erratic, Dr. ARNOLD, of Rugby. "His scholarship," says his Biographer, "was chiefly displayed in his power of extempore translation into English. This he had possessed in a remarkable degree from the time that he was a boy at Winchester, where the practice of reading the whole passage from Greek or Latin into good English, without construing each particular sentence word by word, had been much encouraged by Dr. Gabell, and in his youthful vacations during his Oxford course he used to enliven the sick-bed of his sister Susannah by the readiness with which, in the evenings, he would sit by her side, and translate book after book of the history of Herodotus. So essential did he consider this method to a sound study of the classics, that he published an elaborate defence of it in the *Quarterly Journal of Education*; and when delivering his *Modern History* lectures at Oxford, where he much lamented the prevalence of the opposite system, he could not resist the temptation of protesting against it, with no other excuse for introducing the subject than the mention of the Latin style of the middle age historians. In itself, he looked upon it as the only means of really entering into the spirit of the ancient authors; and requiring, as he did besides, that the translation should be made into idiomatic English, and if possible, into that style of English which most corresponded to the period or the subject of the Greek or Latin writer in question, he considered it further as an excellent exercise in the principles of taste and in the knowledge and use of the English language, no less than of those of Greece and Rome."

As a stimulus to young clergymen, and a hint to meddlers with the Sacred Text, I venture to subjoin an extract from the private letter of a distinguished critical friend. "I have been forty years in my work, and am just now *beginning* to feel that when I read the Hebrew or Greek, I can take the ideas as it were in a vernacular way, and without the aid of Commentary. But such are the helps now, that one needs not half that time to get where I begin to feel that I am. Just as I am prepared to begin my work, I am past the usual boundary of human life, and must abandon the hope of doing much. But I had for 15 years no adequate tools to work with, and as these are now provided, a shorter journey will bring others where I am."

